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Country incentives to participate in cooperative arrangements which either fully or partially internalize
climate change externalities from carbon emissions involve critical asymmetries. Small countries trade
off own country costs of carbon mitigation actions against their own benefits from global improvements
in climate which benefit all. Small countries thus have limited incentive to participate as their actions,
while costly to them, have a significant impact on global temperature change which mainly benefits
others. Here we build on the work of Shapley and Shubik (1969) which suggests that the core of a
global warming game without transferable utility may be empty and use numerical simulation methods
to analyse country incentives to participate in carbon emission limitation negotiations using a micro
global warming structure related to that used by Uzawa(2003).We discuss how the presence of international
trade in goods affects the willingness of countries to join international negotiations on climate change.
We calibrate our simulation structure to business as usual scenarios for the period 2006-2036. We
go significantly beyond the PAGE model relied on in the Stern (2006) report in capturing multi-country
interactive effects on the benefit side of climate change mitigation. We show how the perceived severity
of global climate change damage influences participation decisions, and importantly how international
trade makes participation more likely.
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We discuss how the presence of international trade inuences country willingness to par-
ticipate in global climate change negotiations and why. These negotiations are aimed at
reducing global temperature change by having countries mutually agree to reduce carbon
emissions and in this way jointly internalize the associated global externalities from own
country emissions.In practice, what form actual negotiations take will depend on agree-
ments struck between participants, including penalties on non-participants. Here, we limit
our discussion to the participation decision and do not discuss the form that cooperative
arrangements will take. We emphasize the potential contribution of international trade in
facilitating individual country participation in negotiations.
Climate change is a classic global externality problem that has been analyzed either ex-
plicitly or implicitly by Shapley and Shubik (1969), Barrett (1994), Uzawa(1999) and others.
Their research shows that small players (small countries in our case) have little incentive to
participate in cooperative arrangements which either fully or partially internalize external-
ities unless there are side payments. This is because small countries bear the costs of their
carbon mitigation actions, but being small the benets from resulting improvements in global
climate largely accrue elsewhere. Large countries will have more incentive to participate as
their actions, which while costly to them, can have a signicant impact on themselves via
temperature change. This work on externality also emphasizes, as in Shapley and Shubik
(1969), that the core of a game with global warming but without transferable utility may be
empty.
Here, we present numerical simulation results which not only bear on these issues but
also allow us to evaluate whether participation is made more likely by allowing for the
presence of international trade. We follow an analytical structure of a global warming game
originally due to Uzawa (1999), but unlike Uzawa transferable utility(or side payments) is
not allowed. We rst discuss the case with a single consumption good globally and allow
country endowments to be either put aside to reduce global temperature change (i.e. reduce
carbon emissions) or be consumed. For this structure, in the symmetric case there exists
1a critical country size such that countries larger than this are willing to participate and
negotiate reductions in carbon emissions, while countries smaller than the critical size are
not willing to do so. We then investigate the model implications for the asymmetric case
using 2006 data on a series of large economies (US, EU, Japan, China, India, Russia, Brazil,
and Rest of World) using a global structure and explore the role of preferences and other
parameters on the critical country size for decisions on participation.
We use data on consumption and trade for the economies we analyze along with growth
proles for these countries, and various damage and temperature change assumptions for
business as usual scenarios and undertake numerical investigation with our analytical struc-
ture. The base data is for a single 50 year period 2006-2056 with assumed yearly growth
rates over the period. We use calibration to a temperature change function for prospective
changes in temperature under a business as usual scenario out to both 2036 and 2056, and
use various estimates of associated damage over the ranges as reported by Stern (2007) and
Mendelsohn (2007).
We then generalize the analysis to the case of one good per country so as to allow for
the presence of international trade in the analysis. We use this combined Armington trade
and global warming model to investigate the impacts of international trade on the decision
of individual countries to participate in global negotiations to reduce emissions. In this
structure, the presence of trade produces positive terms of trade eects from lowered domestic
sales of the own country goods, enhancing direct country gains from lowered temperatures
from own country actions on global climate change. It also reduces the costs of actions since
reductions in consumption are spread over many goods and so the forgoing marginal utility
of consumption from consumption restraint is less adversely aected compared to the one
homogeneous good case.
Our numerical results also show that countries that may not be willing to participate in
the one good case may be willing to participate in the N good case with international trade.
These results therefore suggest that international trade can be a positive factor in motivating
participation in international negotiation on climate change.Our results also show that the
incentive to join such negotiations varies greatly with the prospective size of damages.
22 A Theoretical Model of Climate Change Negotiation
Participation
Global warming negotiations aim at achieving joint carbon emission abatement in the
presence of externality eects across countries.The rst round of global negotiations in this
vein concluded in Kyoto 1997, and now continue in the current post Bali road map negotia-
tions set to conclude in Copenhagen in 2009 with agreement for the period after 2012.These
negotiations aim to achieve joint mutual agreement to act, and will only conclude when all
parties accept each others commitments. More detailed discussion of these negotiations is
given in Walsh and Whalley (2008).
We focus on individual country incentives to participate in negotiation, rather than the
outcome of such negotiations. Eectively,we investigate whether the core of the cooperative
game represented by the country strategy space over possible actives on climate change is
empty or not. We build on relevant literature on the core. In the no externality case, Scarf
(1960) established the non emptiness of the core. Debreu and Scarf (1967) later showed
how in a replica economy the core of the economy collapses to the competitive equilibrium,
establishing a form of equivalence between the core and competitive equilibria. Shapley
and Shubik (1969) showed by notes and example that the core of an economy with external
diseconomies may be empty. In cases where own agent actions to internalize externalities
(i.e. reduce carbon emissions) have little own eect (such as with small countries), but at
substantial cost, there is little incentive to act or join cooperative arrangements. Shapley and
Shubik (1969) implicitly discuss a case with non transferable utility, but where transferable
utility is allowed (as in Uzawa (1999)) the non emptiness of the case will be reversed due to
the joint gains from internalization.
This literature thus suggests that where side payments do not occur fully participatory
collective global agreement on carbon emission reduction may not be feasible since the num-
ber of countries participating in the agreement would need to be small to achieve mutual
agreement since each country can free-ride without any punishment.Sub global agreements
3with penalties by participants on non participants to force participation may be feasible, but
we do not analyze these here.
The likelihood of positive participation also depends critically on the severity of damage
from the externality. We later argue that as we introduce international trade between coun-
tries into the model it likely makes agreement easier to reach. We rst set out the theoretical
model. We begin with the one-good case, and then move to the N good, N country case.
Empirically based analyses follow.
We rst assume that there are N countries in the world and each owns and consumes
the same good. We will analyze a single period of a number of years during which each
economy grows. We assume that consumption of the good by the country directly generates
emissions of carbon which in turn raise global temperatures. countries receive positive utility
from consumption but negative utility from temperature change. Countries thus have an
upper bound on own consumption, and if they consumes less than the upper bound they
experienced less temperature change. If they are small, their own actions have little or no
eect on temperature change.
As we will later analyse the impacts of agreements to reduce carbon emissions over a
given period of time, the single period model has been set up to cover a number of years, 50.
In this 50 year period, we focus on changes in consumption (use of one good) and utility, and
measure change in these variables relative to the outcome of zero growth over the period.
The utility function is thus dened over 50 year changes on consumption and temperature
change. Potential use of the good reects to changes in potential output from the economy
over 50 years.
We rst analyze a business as usual (BAU) scenario which reects current observed
growth rates remaining unchanged over 50 years with no global or single country emissions
limitation initiatives in place. The actual change in consumption for each country i over this
time period t relative to a stationary state is Ri, while the total potential output of each
country is given by a   Ri. Countries can decide to consume less than their potential, but
since global temperature change over the period is linked to global consumption consuming
at less than potential reduces utility lowering global temperature change. Consumption in
4each country is given by Ri <   Ri, where Ri denes actual consumption change over the
model period, and   Ri is potential consumption change.   R =
P
  Ri is world potential
consumption.
The utility of each country from both consumption and temperature change over the
period is reected in a utility change function with arguments given by its own change in
consumption as well as the temperature change of the world, T. Damage from climate
change thus appears in utility form, not as production damage as in many other papers.
Without loss of generality, we initially assume the utility change function for each country
has a Cobb-Douglas form given by (1) and later use CES and alternative forms.







In this specication C can be thought of the global temperature change at which all
economic activity ceases (say 10oC). In this case, as T approaches C utility utility goes
to zero. In this form, as T goes to zero there is no welfare impact of temperature change.
Utility change over the model period (2006-2056) increases as temperature change falls.
The share parameter  reects the severity of damage (in utility terms) from temperature
change, which we later calibrate to various damage estimates from business as usual global
temperature change reported by Stern (2006) and Mendelsoln (2007).
Global temperature change, in turn, is determined by the change in carbon emissions
over the period across all countries in the model. We adopt a simple temperature change
function and assume that emissions over the period by each country equal the change in
consumption times country emissions intensity (emissions/GDP) so as to allow for diering
emissions intensities by country. Dening the emissions intensity of country i as ei, we use
a simple power function (2) for global temperature change due to changes in emissions by






b + c (2)
In this structure, a carbon reduction commitment by a single country implies reduced
5change in consumption, and this has both negative and positive eects on utility change for
the countries over the model period. On the one hand, a reduction in consumption change
lowers utility change for the country by reducing consumption change, but on the other hand,
country consumption change reductions lower global emissions and hence world temperature
change, and increase the utility both of the country reducing the emissions and all other
countries.
If the benets of lowered global temperatures from own country actions are larger than the
utility loss from reducing own consumption change, the country has an incentive to reduce its
emissions, and if they can negotiate cooperatively with all other countries will be better o.
We thus assume that in this case a country will be willing to participate in negotiations on
mutual agreements to reduce emissions by all countries since larger positive welfare benets
will follow from collective actions. Were there negative benets, in the absence of penalties
on them from other countries who participate in joint action (which we assume) then the
country has an incentive to free ride on the actions of others and opt out of negotiations.the
analytical structure can be modied to capture agreed penalty structure of participants. We
can use the same approach to also consider decisions by groups (or coalitions) of countries
to enter into singular negotiations on a sub global group bases.
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63 Calibration and Data
We calibrate our one good model to a base case business as usual (BAU) scenario for the
period 2006-2056 for eight region country grouping, US, EU, Japan, China, India, Russia,
Brazil and the rest of the world (ROW). We use measures of GDP growth over the period
to determine the change in consumption by country over the period under BAU. We rst
assume that country growth rates in the period 2000-2056 remain unchanged over the whole
period of 50 years between 2006 and 2056 and then use a discount rate of 1.5% to calculate
the discounted present value of GDP over this period for each economy.We then calibrate a
temperature change function for assumed BAU temperature change over the period drawn
from key literature sources, including Stern (2006) and Mendelsohn (2007) and preferences
for each country using alternative damage estimates for the same sources.
Using model parameters generated by calibration, we can then reduce own consumption
for individual countries and regions by 1% and assess the sign of the welfare eect. From this
sign, we then determine willingness to participate in global emission reduction negotiations.
We use data on 2006 GDP by country, 2000-2006 average growth rates and 2004 emis-
sions intensity data to determine parameters a,b and c from equation (2) for a given BAU
temperature change. We then use various estimates of damage from BAU emission increases
to determine  by calibration. These parameters then determine which countries satisfy the
condition in equation (4) and thus, are willing to participate in a carbon reduction agreement.
Emissions data by country are for the year 2004 and at rst projected to 2006 as the model
base year for the period 2006-2056. The Stern review (2006) projects a "business as usual"
(BAU) growth path of emissions which implies at approximately 2C increase in average
global temperature by the 2036 and a 5C increase by 20561. We use this BAU scenario for
temperature change to calibrate our model temperature change function.In doing this, we
1The Stern Review (2006)projections are that even if the annual global ow of emissions remains un-
changed, the global stock of GHG concentrations would still reach 550ppm CO2e by 2050.In the Stern BAU
paths, the annual ow of emissions is accelerating, and the level of 550ppm CO2e could be reached as early
as 2035, at which point there is 77-99 per cent of chance of global average temperature rise exceeding 2oC. If
the level of 750ppm CO2e is reached around 2050, then the temperature change will be near 5oC according
to their projections.
7make the strong assumption that emission intensities will not change as we move forward
in time and use current (2000-2006) unchanged country growth rates to calculate implied
emissions. Later we discuss how relaxing this assumption aects our results.
The data used and the resulting calculations of model based measures (emissions, GDP
change 2006-2056) for the BAU projection and used in calibration are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: GDP and Emissions Data and Projections to 2036 and 2056
(Trillions US$/Billions of Metric Tons)
US EU Japan China India Russia Brazil ROW World
GDP 2004 11.712 13.044 4.608 2.254 0.667 0.592 0.664 8.048 41.590
Emissions 2004 6.050 3.841 1.258 5.009 1.343 1.525 0.332 7.880 27.241
Emission Inten-
sity 2004
0.517 0.294 0.273 2.222 2.012 2.577 0.500 0.979 0.655
GDP 2006 13.164 10.636 4.368 2.645 0.912 0.987 1.067 14.682
Emissions 2006 6.800 3.132 1.193 5.877 1.835 2.544 0.534 14.376 36.289
Actual Annual
Growth Rate
2.657 1.956 1.652 9.568 6.833 6.745 3.104 3.662
Annual Growth
Rate less 1.5% for
discount
1.117 0.426 0.127 7.924 5.230 5.144 1.557 2.107
GDP 2056 22.943 13.158 4.656 119.763 11.666 12.120 2.311 41.641 228.258
Emissions in
2056
11.851 3.874 1.271 266.140 23.474 31.238 1.156 40.771 379.774
GDP 2006-2036 471.310 341.074 133.673 318.879 66.327 70.673 41.055 618.453
Net emissions
2006-2036
39.460 6.473 0.715 532.308 78.416 105.838 4.515 174.270 941.996
GDP 2006-2056 885.060 593.877 225.669 1595.092 216.377 227.567 81.131 1306.574
Net emissions
2006-2056
117.183 18.273 1.978 3250.796 343.635 459.330 13.879 560.511 4765.585
GDP and emissions data by country for 2004 are used to calculate emissions intensities.
Emission intensities, ei, are calculated as emissions divided by GDP and are reported in row
three. Row four reports GDP in 2006. Row ve reports calculations of emissions in 2006
using the 2006 measures of GDP and the emission intensities calculated from 2004 data.
Average country/region growth rates for the period 2000-2006 are reported in row six of
Table 1. Row seven reports the annual growth rates we use in our calculation for a BAU
scenario over the period 2006-2056 with a reduction of 1.5 percentage points for discounting
8in our projections. Row eight reports GDP projections for 2056 based on the 2006 GDP
and the assumed growth rates. Using an assumption of constant emissions intensities gives
us row nine the emissions projection for each country/region in 2056. Rows ten and eleven
report computed GDP and emissions for the 2 periods 2006-2036 and 2006-2056. The result
of these calculations are that in the BAU scenario net emissions of carbon would accumulate
to about 942 billion tons over the period of 2006-2036 and 4766 billion metric tons over the
period of 2006-2056.
We use these emission changes over the period to solve for the values of the parameters in
the temperature change function using equation (2).Temperature change over the period is
written as a function of the emissions change over the same period. We use a power function
of accumulated emissions over the period. Using the data for 2006,2036, and 2056 in the
above table,and assuming the temperature change at these three points to be 0C, 2C, and
5C respectively, we can solve for the values of parameters a, b, and c.
0 = a(36:289   36:289)
b + c (5)
2 = a(941:996)
b + c (6)
5 = a(4765:585)
b + c (7)
Solving these equations for the parameters a,b, and c yields values of 0:0417, 0:5652 and
0 . Substituting these values to equation (2), yields:
T = g(
X




The nal step in our calibration is to generate values for the parameters  and  in the
utility function. As noted earlier, we normalize  and  to sum to one to preserve linear
homogeneity so we can more easily calculate money metric measures of welfare change.These
parameters for the model are calibrated using literature sources (Stern, 2006; Mendelsohn,
92007). Using the Stern Review (2005), Mendelsohn (2007) and other literature estimates of
the damage cost of emissions along a business-as-usual (BAU) path in GDPterms, we treat
these as utility change of the same proportion and use these estimates to calibrate the model
parameters.
A wide range of estimates of damage for BAU emissions growth can be found in various
sources, ranging from 5 to 49.5 percent of GDP. We alternatively treat these as utility losses
in a number of calculations with changed damage estimates. For each damage estimate
assumed, we recalibrate the model parameters and compute the utility parameters that
would give rise to each of the implicit utility reductions. Without temperature change, the
utility change function can be written as U
i = R
i . In the presence of temperature
change damage, we have Ui=U
i = ((C   T)=C) . These equations can be used to
calibrate the parameters  and  for dierent damage cost scenarios with a temperature
change T of 5C between 2006 and 2056. The value change for C is important since the
smaller is C, the larger the massive value of damage that the model will allow in Calibration.
We use C = 10, which then be used in sensitivity analysis. Table 2 reports the calibrated
preference parameters under alternative damage assumptions.
Table 2: Calibrated Preference Parameters Under Alternative Damage Assumption














104 Experiments Exploring Global Carbon Reduction Ne-
gotiation Participation in the One Good Case.
We next execute counterfactuals using the model. We rst consider what happens to
welfare if each country reduces separately consumption by 1%. We later consider cases of
joint reduction.We use a time horizon of fty years so that the calculation for each country
captures the trade o between a reduction of output by 1% over the whole 50 year period
and a lowered global temperature change over fty years. In each case we compute the
change in utility for each country. A positive number implies that the own country benet
of lowered temperature change over fty years is larger than the utility cost of the own
country consumption reduction. This implies that the country will be willing to enter into
a carbon reduction agreement whereby it agrees to reduce its own consumption since there
is no incentive to depart from a collective agreement.
The calculations we make for the one good case which assumes that there is no inter-
national trade are reported below in Table 3. Each row reports the results using dierent
assumptions regarding the damage from a BAU temperature increase over the period. Row
one assumes a 5% utility loss, row two a 10% utility loss, row three a 20% utility loss, row
four a 30% utility loss, row ve a 35% utility loss, and so on up to the 49:5% loss at the
high end of the range we use following literature estimates. Looking at row thirteen we see
that the US, China, India, and Russia in some cases benet from own country consump-
tion reductions and hence would participate in negotiations on emissions reduction, but for
this to occur the cost damage in emissions reduction of 49:5% must apply. The US, China
and the other countries by 2056 are relatively large so their reduction in consumption has a
signicant eect on global temperatures. For smaller countries, a reduction in consumption
yields little reduction in global temperatures.
Looking at row ve if the utility damage cost of a 5C temperature increase is assumed
to be 35% no country is willing to enter into a carbon reduction agreement. When the cost
rises to 40% then China is willing to reduce carbon emissions. As the cost rises above 40%,
11more countries are willing to participate in the agreement. These results thus suggest that
for a given level of damage larger countries are more willing to participate than smaller one.
Also, the more the damage associated with temperature increases the more countries are
willing to participate. They also point to participation in negotiations only occurring for
high levels of damage from carbon emissions.
Table 3: Utility change for 1% decrease in consumption change for each
national economy relative to BAU, 2006-2056
Damage US EU Japan China India Russia Brazil ROW
5.0% -5.2138 -3.8625 -1.7368 -7.9374 -1.2979 -1.3590 -0.5584 -7.1531
10.0% -2.9634 -2.4374 -1.3090 -3.7493 -0.7514 -0.7831 -0.3742 -3.7606
20.0% -0.8376 -0.8660 -0.6849 -0.6795 -0.2206 -0.2273 -0.1516 -0.8928
30.0% -0.1837 -0.2469 -0.3032 -0.0759 -0.0501 -0.0508 -0.0501 -0.1583
35.0% -0.0740 -0.1155 -0.1811 -0.0158 -0.0204 -0.0204 -0.0255 -0.0558
37.5% -0.0443 -0.0749 -0.1337 -0.0044 -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0173 -0.0308
40.0% -0.0250 -0.0461 -0.0944 0.0009 -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0111 -0.0158
45.0% -0.0058 -0.0132 -0.0361 0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0035 -0.0025
46.0% -0.0039 -0.0093 -0.0273 0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0013
47.0% -0.0024 -0.0062 -0.0193 0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0005
48.0% -0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0121 0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0001
49.0% -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0057 0.0024 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0005
49.5% 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0022 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0006
We have also made calculations of the utility gain or loss relative to the BAU path for
groups of countries, or coalitions. If groups of countries pre-commit to jointly reduce their
consumption by 1% (and hence emissions) then the impacts of joint actions on temperature
change are larger, and coalitions of countries would be more willing to participate in global
climate change negotiations. In Table 4, the levels of damage at which participation occurs
increase, but it striking that even for large coalitions (such as India, China, Japan) the
damage levels remain very high before participation occurs.
12Table 4: Utility change for 1% decrease in consumption change for sub global
coalitions relative to BAU, 2006-2056
Assumed Utility Damage for 5C temperature change US-EU-Japan BRIC Ind.-Chi.-Jap.
5.0% -16.8341 -11.5091 -10.0273
10.0% -7.4474 -5.2263 -5.5136
20.0% -1.1629 -0.8560 -1.4496
30.0% -0.1062 -0.0782 -0.2927
35.0% -0.0179 -0.0108 -0.1126
37.5% -0.0033 0.0003 -0.0657
40.0% 0.0028 0.0046 -0.0362
45.0% 0.0043 0.0050 -0.0079
46.0% 0.0040 0.0045 -0.0052
47.0% 0.0036 0.0041 -0.0031
48.0% 0.0032 0.0036 -0.0016
49.0% 0.0028 0.0032 -0.0004
49.5% 0.0026 0.0030 0.0000
We have also examined the impact results of using dierent time horizons for countries
to analyze participation decisions.The BAU scenario we use for the period 2006-2036 is that
global temperatures will rise 2C by 2036, and we use the same calibration as above only
now for the time period 2006-2036.
The results for the two periods 2006-2036 and 2006-2056 are reported in Table 5 below.
Results under the A heading are the results for period 2006-2036. Values under the B heading
are for the period 2006-2056. These are taken directly from Table 2.Table 5 results imply
that the utility change values are uniformly higher for the case 2006-2056 than for 2006-2036.
Looking at Table 5 and comparing columns A and B it is clear that the values in B,
column indicating the longer time horizon, are larger than the values in column A. This
implies that moving to a longer time horizon increases willingness to participate in carbon
13reduction initiatives.In the 2036 time frame, only when the utility loss reaches 48% will
China be willing to participate in the carbon reduction agreements. While in the 2056 lime
frame, China will be willing to participate in carbon reduction agreements under 48% utility
loss scenario.
Table 5: Utility change for 1% decrease in consumption change for each
national economy under BAU, 2006-2036and 2006-2056
Cost US EU Japan China India Russia Brazil ROW
5.0% A -4.8184 -3.3113 -3.4216 -2.2192 -0.5548 -0.4001 -0.4136 -5.5742
B -5.2138 -3.8625 -1.7368 -7.9374 -1.2979 -1.3590 -0.5584 -7.1531
10.0% A -3.1026 -2.3718 -2.9208 -1.2930 -0.3751 -0.2692 -0.3145 -3.3472
B -2.9634 -2.4374 -1.3090 -3.7493 -0.7514 -0.7831 -0.3742 -3.7606
20.0% A -1.1514 -1.1106 -2.0208 -0.3836 -0.1547 -0.1097 -0.1677 -1.0652
B -0.8376 -0.8660 -0.6849 -0.6795 -0.2206 -0.2273 -0.1516 -0.8928
30.0% A -0.3446 -0.4333 -1.2452 -0.0872 -0.0521 -0.0363 -0.0758 -0.2664
B -0.1837 -0.2469 -0.3032 -0.0759 -0.0501 -0.0508 -0.0501 -0.1583
35.0% A -0.1654 -0.2412 -0.8998 -0.0351 -0.0267 -0.0184 -0.0458 -0.1151
B -0.0740 -0.1155 -0.1811 -0.0158 -0.0204 -0.0204 -0.0255 -0.0558
37.5% A -0.1087 -0.1716 -0.7365 -0.0207 -0.0181 -0.0124 -0.0340 -0.0713
B -0.0443 -0.0749 -0.1337 -0.0044 -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0173 -0.0308
40.0% A -0.0678 -0.1164 -0.5791 -0.0113 -0.0117 -0.0079 -0.0242 -0.0416
B -0.0250 -0.0461 -0.0944 0.0009 -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0111 -0.0158
45.0% A -0.0197 -0.0409 -0.2805 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0093 -0.0100
B -0.0058 -0.0132 -0.0361 0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0035 -0.0025
46.0% A -0.0140 -0.0303 -0.2230 -0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0071 -0.0066
B -0.0039 -0.0093 -0.0273 0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0013
47.0% A -0.0092 -0.0210 -0.1664 -0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0050 -0.0039
B -0.0024 -0.0062 -0.0193 0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0005
48.0% A -0.0053 -0.0129 -0.1103 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0018
B -0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0121 0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0001
49.0% A -0.0021 -0.0059 -0.0549 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0002
B -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0057 0.0024 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0005
49.5% A -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0274 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0005
B 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0022 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0006
Note: A-2006-2036; B-2006-2056.
145 International Trade and Global Emission Reduction
Negotiation Participation
We next consider the eect of international trade on the willingness of countries to par-
ticipate in carbon reduction agreements. As before, we assume there are N countries in the
world, however now use an Armington structure in which each good in each country is dier-
ent, yielding an N good N country model. We use nested CES preferences for consumption
change in each country where the nesting structure covers two stages.At the rst level, pref-
erences are again dened over Ri and T. At the second stage Ri is a composite of the
individual country goods, rather than a single homogeneous good. As before, a larger Ri
and lower T give rise to higher utility. In the one-good case, there is no international
trade and country use of their good equals consumption for the country. In the trade case,
own country consumption change is no longer equal to potential consumption change using
its own good. Some of their own good is exported and own goods of other countries are
imported. Consumption change is thus a composite of goods from dierent countries. The
structure of the resulting trade equilibrium model with temperature change can be divided
into three levels or parts.
Temperature Change and Top Level Utility Function
At the rst top level, the function of forms for utility and temperature change are the
same as in the one-good case.












b + c (10)
In this case, however RCi represents the composite consumption change in the good for
15each country i , while RSi represents the use of the own good for each country i. Because
of trade RCi  RSi, unlike in the one good case where RCi = RSi.
Composite Final Consumption Goods by country
The composite consumption good RCi is a CES function of domestic and imported
consumption goods, which is similar that used in the nested CES Armington models (see
Whalley (1985)). The model eectively becomes an Armington N good N country pure
trade economy in which the endowment is variable.
The resulting sub-utility maximization problem can be written as











s:t: pd(i)D(i) + pm(i)M(i) = Inc(i) (12)
Inc(i) = p(i)RSi (13)
Where D(i) and M(i) represent consumption of the domestic and a composited imported
goods respectively. The composition of M(i) is determined by a third level of nesting in
the CES preferences in the model.
Composite of Imported Goods
The CES composite commodities at the third level of nesting are composites of imported
goods for each country. Given that each country has one good it can sell, but N   1 goods
it can consume, the CES composite of other goods denes an import composite. This can
be represented as the outcome of a sub-utility maximization exercise.



















i = pm(i)M(i) (15)
where RM(i) is the imported good i by country j and pm(i) is the composite import price

























As we have only one good for use in each country, the price of basic domestic goods p(i)
dine the imput prices by purchases of goods. The model can be amended to also capture
taris or other import barriers in country i.
Trade Equilibrium
In this structure, given values of RSi a trade equilibrium is given by prices p1 :::pN for





i ) + Di = RSi (i = 1; ;N) (18)
In this structure, unlike in the one good case, as countries contemplate participating in
global environmental negotiations if they reduce emissions by reducing RSi there will be
general equilibrium implications on all prices and quantities. Importantly, a reduction in
RSi will typically cause the price of the own good i to rise giving a terms of trade gain
to the country making the emissions (RSi) reduction. This will spread the burden of the
country emissions reduction to all other countries reducing the own country cost of emissions
17reductions to the country making the reduction. This will, in turn, increase the willingness
to participate in global emissions reductions negotiations2.
Comparison of Trade and Non-trade Cases of Participation De-
cision Analysis
Using the nested trade-consumption model, composite consumption RCi will change
as RSi changes. Similar to the one-good simple case, we can evaluate the utility impact of
a change in RSi. Once again there will be a direct eect on consumption change, but now
on consumption change of all N goods through trade, and once again a temperature change.
These eects will determine participation in global environmental negotiations.
We note that it is dicult to compare the trade and non-trade cases precisely, and for
two reasons. First, when trade is omitted the demand of each country in the simple one-good
case is its own good . With trade introduced in the model, the demand of each country is
the nested CES composed commodity, and the use of the own good of each country enters
the budget constraint. Thus,given the same use of own country good, consumption change
is dierent between the trade and non-trade cases.
Second, what is exogenous is dierent between the two cases. In the non-trade case,
the maximum consumption change of the world is exogenous, and the consumption of each
country can vary. In the trade case, the own good use of each country is exogenous. But
consumption changes as the price of each good changes and aects the budget constraint for
each country.
Simulation Results for the Trade Case with 2006-2056 Data Base
and Comparison to the Non-trade Case
To analyze participation decisions in the with trade model and make comparisons to the
2If a two good equilibria were used for each country and emissions reduction initiatives involved increased
carbon (energy) costs which for some countries aected export industries, terms of trade eects eects could
work in the opposite direction for some conditions. We are grateful for Bob Staiger for this comment.
18one good no trade case, we calibrate the with trade model to the same GDP and emissions
data but now add trade and also calibrate the nested CES preference functions by country.
We use bilateral trade data as well as the same GDP data for 2006 for each country, and
project forward using annual growth rate data as for the one good model. We assume the
trade structure to be unchanged in proportional terms for the whole period of 2006-2056.
For each country's change in RSi, there is a then a new equilibrium set of prices and new
trade volumes and hence a value for Ui. These we take once again to determine decisions
on participation in global environmental negotiations.
The results reported in Table 6 reveal that generally speaking taking international trade
into account makes carbon reduction agreement participation more likely. Comparing the
A (no trade) and B (with international trade) one can see from Table 6 that the values in
the B column are generally larger than the values in the A row. Higher values indicate more
benets from reducing your own output hence participation is more likely. For the US, in
the trade model case participation occurs with only 10% damage, while for the no trade case
no participation occurs. similar change in participation decisions occurs for other regions.
The intuition for these results is that reducing use of a country own good raises its price,
thereby improving their terms of trade making carbon reduction negotiation participation
more attractive than in the no trade case.
19Table 6: Analysis for Utility Change for 1% decrease in consumption of own good by each National Economy
for One good and N good(with trade)cases for the period 2006-2056
Cost US EU Japan China India Russia Brazil ROW
5.0% A -5.2138 -3.8625 -1.7368 -7.9374 -1.2979 -1.3590 -0.5584 -7.1531
B -0.2345 -0.3292 -0.1917 -0.6179 -0.0740 -0.2377 -0.0825 -0.7354
10.0% A -2.9634 -2.4374 -1.3090 -3.7493 -0.7514 -0.7831 -0.3742 -3.7606
B 0.0279 -0.0834 -0.0797 0.0488 -0.0004 -0.0974 -0.0375 -0.1759
20.0% A -0.8376 -0.8660 -0.6849 -0.6795 -0.2206 -0.2273 -0.1516 -0.8928
B 0.1174 0.0755 0.0387 0.2017 0.0304 0.0003 0.0019 0.0837
30.0% A -0.1837 -0.2469 -0.3032 -0.0759 -0.0501 -0.0508 -0.0501 -0.1583
B 0.0576 0.0602 0.0629 0.0791 0.0167 0.0093 0.0079 0.0477
35.0% A -0.0740 -0.1155 -0.1811 -0.0158 -0.0204 -0.0204 -0.0255 -0.0558
B 0.0315 0.0394 0.0544 0.0397 0.0096 0.0065 0.0063 0.0258
37.5% A -0.0443 -0.0749 -0.1337 -0.0044 -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0173 -0.0308
B 0.0218 0.0297 0.0472 0.0268 0.0069 0.0050 0.0052 0.0177
40.0% A -0.0250 -0.0461 -0.0944 0.0009 -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0111 -0.0158
B 0.0143 0.0211 0.0386 0.0175 0.0047 0.0036 0.0040 0.0115
45.0% A -0.0058 -0.0132 -0.0361 0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0035 -0.0025
B 0.0046 0.0079 0.0194 0.0067 0.0017 0.0015 0.0017 0.0040
46.0% A -0.0039 -0.0093 -0.0273 0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0013
B 0.0034 0.0059 0.0155 0.0054 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0031
47.0% A -0.0024 -0.0062 -0.0193 0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0005
B 0.0024 0.0042 0.0115 0.0043 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0023
48.0% A -0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0121 0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0001
B 0.0015 0.0026 0.0076 0.0034 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0017
49.0% A -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0057 0.0024 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0005
B 0.0008 0.0013 0.0038 0.0027 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0012
49.5% A 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0022 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0006
B 0.0005 0.0007 0.0019 0.0024 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0010
Note: A-no international trade (one good) case; B-with international trade (N good) case.
206 Concluding Remarks
We consider the incentives for individual countries to engage in global full participation
negotiations on carbon reduction agreements. To reduce carbon emissions a country reduces
its consumption of its own good. This yeilds two counteracting eects. The direct eect of
reducing its own consumption is that consumption declines and with its utility. However,
reducing carbon emissions also lowers global temperatures and that increases utility. In a
simple one good model the trade o between these two eects determines incentives to free
ride (assuming no penalties on free rides), but in the N goods case with trade changes in a
country's term of trade also come into play.
Calibrating no trade and with trade models to 2006-2056 business as usual scenarios
reveals an unwillingness by countries in global climate change negotiations to participate
unless the damage from climate change is large. Larger countries are more likely to partici-
pate because a given percentage reduction in output will result in a larger reduction in global
temperatures the larger the country. Longer time horizons also lead to greater willingness
to participate for rapidly growing countries. But, the presence of international trade makes
carbon reduction agreements more likely because reducing the output of your own (export)
good has a positive term of trade eect which reduces the cost of output reduction.
We conclude by noting that the analytical structure for numerical simulation analysis
of carbon reduction initiative impacts which we present here also has wider application.
This framework can also be used to analyze the links between penalties and participation,
such as trade barriers used to force compliance with sub-group initiatives, or the size of
accompanying nancial transfers needed to induce participation. These and other extensions
we plan to explore in following work, as well as modifying of the cost function used for
emissions reduction.
21References
[1] Barrett, Scott,1994. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements.Oxford
Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 46, Special Issue on Environmental Economics,
pp.878-894.
[2] Botteon, Michele and Carlo Carraro,1997.Burden-Sharing and Coalition Stability in En-
vironmental Negotiations with Asymmetric Countries.in C. Carraro, ed.,International
Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
[3] Chen Zhiqi,1997.Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analy-
sis.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32,170-188.
[4] Chen Zhiqi,1997.Can Economic Activities Lead to Climate Chaos? An Economic Anal-
ysis of Global Warming.The Canadian journal of Economics, Vol.30, No.2, pp349-366.
[5] Debreu, Gerard and Herbert Scarf,1963.A Limit Theorem on the core of an Econ-
omy.International Economic Review, Vol. 4, No.3. (Sep., 1963), pp. 235-246.
[6] Mendelsohn, Robert, O,2006.A Critique of the Stern Report, Regulation.(Winter 2006-
2007), pp.42-46.
[7] Scarf, Herbert E ,1967.The Core of an N Person Game.Econometrica, Vol.35, No.1.
(Jan., 1967), pp. 50-69.
[8] Shapley, Lloyd,S., Shubik, Martin ,1969.On the Core of an Economic System with Ex-
ternalities. American Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp678-684.
[9] Stern,Nicholas ,2006.Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. London, UK:
Her Majesty's Treasury.
[10] Uzawa, H. ,1999.Global Warming as a Cooperative Game. Environmental Economics
and Policy Studies, 1999, Vol.2, pp.1-37.
[11] Uzawa, H. ,2003.Economic Tneory and Global Warming. Cambridge University Press
(August 18, 2003).
22[12] Walsh, S and J.Whalley, 2008.Bringing the Copenhagen climate change negotiations to
conclusion, paper presented at CESifo conference on " Europe and Global Environmen-
tal Negotiations", July 14-15, 2008.
[13] Whalley, John 1985.Trade liberalization among major world trading areas, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985.
23